ALEXANDER COHN Arbitrator - Mediator P.O. Box 4006 Napa, CA 94558. (707) 226-7096

# IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES

In the Matter of a Controversy

between

INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION 1245,
and

PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY.

Involving the discharge of A R
Grievant.

OPINION AND AWARD

ARBITRATION

ARBITRATION

ARB. # 312

This Arbitration arises pursuant to Agreement between INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, LOCAL UNION 1245, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and PACIFIC GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY, hereinafter referred to as the "Company," under which BRENDA LEGGE and DOUG VEADER were appointed Company Board Members on the Board of Arbitration ("Board"), F. E. ED DWYER and JOE OSTERLUND were appointed Union Board Members, and ALEXANDER COHN was appointed Neutral Board Member and under which a decision by Board Majority is final and binding upon the parties.

Hearing was held on October 11, 2012, Vacaville, California. The parties were afforded full opportunity for the examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the introduction of relevant exhibits, and for closing argument. Post-hearing briefs were received from the parties on or before December 26, 2012, and the matter was submitted.

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1	APPEARANCES:	
2	On behalf of the Union:	
3	JENNY MARSTON, Esquire, Staff Attorney, IBEW, Local 1245, 30 Orange Tree Circle, Vacaville, California 95687.	
5	On behalf of Company:	
6 7	VALERIE SHARPE, Esquire, Legal Department, PG&E, 77 Beale Street, Suite 3112, San Francisco, California 94105.	
8	ISSUE	
9	Whether Grievant was discharged for just cause; and if	
10	not, what shall be the remedy?	
11	RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENT	
12	••••	
13	Title 7. MANAGEMENT OF COMPANY	
14	7.1 MANAGEMENT OF COMPANY	
15	The management of the Company and its business and the direction of its working forces are vested exclusively in Company, and this includes, but is not limited to, the	
16	following: to direct and supervise the work of its employees, to hire, promote, demote, transfer, suspend, and discipline or discharge employees for just cause; to	
17	plan, direct, and control operations; to lay off employees because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; to introduce new or improved methods or facilities,	
18	provided, however, that all of the foregoing shall be subject to the provisions of this Agreement, arbitration or Review Committee decisions, or letters of agreement, or	
19	memorandums of understanding clarifying or interpreting this Agreement.	
20		
21	RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF CODE OF CONDUCT	
22		
23	Company Records and Disclosures	
24	Accurate records and disclosures are critical to PG&E meeting its legal, financial, regulatory, and management obligations. Never misstate facts or omit material	
25	information. Ensure that all Company records, disclosures, and communications are full, fair, accurate, timely, and understandable. Never hide, alter, falsify, or disguise	
26	the true nature of any transaction nor forge endorsements, approvals, or authorizing signatures for any payment.	
27 28	If you know that a record or disclosure is false or misleading, do not enter, process, or approve it. Report the matter to your supervisor or other appropriate person. Examples of company records and disclosures include:	

Financial reports

Expense Reports

Performance metrics reports

Reports to government agencies or other public communications

Workers' compensation or other benefit-related information such as dependent eligibility

**Timecards,** including supporting materials to substantiate requests for time off (emphasis added)

Inspection reports

Meter-reading data for the purposes of customer billing

. . .

## **FACTS**

The salient facts are not in dispute. In 2005, Grievant was hired by the Company as a lineman and later became a Compliance Inspector. On March 16, 2011, he was terminated for falsification of time records in violation of the Company's Code of Conduct.

On February 6, 2011, Grievant was working pre-arranged overtime as a lineman out of the Richmond Service Center. Grievant and a co-worker, D. Mc , were assigned to replace various streetlights throughout Richmond. For work he performed on February 6, Grievant signed and submitted a time card which contained five entries reflecting the time for which he claimed to be entitled to compensation. The entries are 1:

0600 - 0700	Drive Time In
0700 - 1100	Street Lights – Various Loc.
1100 - 1130	Lunch Time
1130 - 1530	Street Lights - Various Loc.
1530 – 1630	Drive Time Home

Because Grievant was working pre-arranged overtime, he was entitled to receive compensation for the hours he worked plus the time it took him to drive to work and back home. Grievant testified that the drive time between Richmond and Vacaville was chargeable to the job according to information he received from his

<sup>- 1</sup>JX 3, Ex. 4,

supervisors, and that he routinely recorded drive time on other jobs the same way.

Grievant's supervisor, Joanne Peterson, approved and began processing the February 6 time card.<sup>2</sup> On February 10, Peterson received information that caused her to question the veracity of the February 6 time card. The Company's claims department contacted Peterson regarding notice from a motorist who reported that, on February 6 she was driving on Highway 80 in Fairfield when a shovel fell off a Company truck and possibly damaged her car. The Company determined that Grievant had likely been the driver based on information provided by the motorist.

Peterson reviewed Grievant's time records to confirm that he was working at the time of the alleged incident. She then contacted Grievant who informed her that on his way from Richmond to the Vacaville Service Center, when he was near the weigh stations on Highway 80 in Fairfield, he noticed a woman driving next to him motioning. Grievant told Peterson he thought something might be hanging off his truck so he pulled off the freeway to investigate. Grievant also told Peterson he inspected the truck for about 10 minutes, concluded nothing was hanging off his truck, and then continued back to the Vacaville Service Center.

Company records show the customer called at 2:38 p.m. and the customer later reported the incident took place 10-15 minutes prior to the call, or about 2:30 p.m. Because Grievant's time card indicated he was repairing street lights at that time, the Company decided to conduct a more thorough investigation into the accuracy of his time card.

On February 16, Peterson and Supervisor Louis Giles interviewed Grievant regarding his time card. When Peterson asked Grievant why he stated on his time card that he was working in Richmond on streetlight replacements until 3:30 p.m. when, in fact, he was in Fairfield, he said he could not remember when he left the Richmond yard. He later said he thought he left the yard at 2:00 p.m. Grievant did

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Peterson was not Grievant's supervisor on the overtime assignment. Joe Egan was Grievant's supervisor on that assignment.

<sup>3</sup>Tr. 85:19-86:3.

not explain why he reported finishing work in Richmond at 3:30 p.m. when in fact, he left for home at 2:00 p.m. Grievant also reported that he and M<sub>c</sub> , the employee with whom he had replaced streetlights, left work at the same time. Based on Grievant's statement in the interview and the fact that M reported on his time card that he stopped working at 2:00 p.m., the Company concluded that Grievant had actually left the Richmond yard at 2:00 p.m.

Grievant was terminated for falsification of his time card. M was neither interviewed as part of the Company's investigation nor disciplined for his time card.

#### POSITION OF COMPANY

The grievance must be denied because Grievant was on notice of the Company's policy prohibiting falsification of time cards. He admitted knowing the Code of Conduct required him to complete his time cards accurately and that failure to do so would be considered falsification of a time card.<sup>3</sup> Falsification of a time record constitutes summary discharge misconduct.

Grievant submitted a false time card on which he sought to obtain at least 30 minutes of overtime pay to which he was not entitled. The evidence shows Grievant left work at 2:00 p.m. His time card records him arriving at home at 4:30 p.m. Grievant offered no explanation for why it took him 2.5 hours to get home from Richmond. Even accepting that Grievant had stopped in Fairfield for 10 minutes to check his truck, this left at least 50 minutes unaccounted for in his alleged drive time home. Grievant told the Company that when he got to Vacaville, he simply moved his personal belongings from the Company vehicle to his personal vehicle which took about 10-15 minutes. Even accepting Grievant's time estimates, he cannot explain at least 30 minutes of time for which he sought to be compensated. Grievant has no factual basis for his assertion that his incorrect entries on the time card where unintentional.

The Union has previously acknowledged, in Review Committee Decision Case No. 20762, that summary termination was an appropriate penalty for an employee who falsified a time card despite the employee's claim that he had correctly filled out the time card.<sup>4</sup>

In sum, just cause exists for Grievant's termination. Theft of time is a serious offense and termination is appropriate, whether the theft was 30 minutes or five hours.

### **POSITION OF UNION**

The grievance must be sustained and Grievant reinstated and made whole for all losses in wages and benefits because the Company did not discharge Grievant for just cause. Under grievance precedent, the Company is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the Grievant knowingly falsified his timecard.<sup>5</sup> The Company did not meet this high burden.

The undisputed evidence supports every entry on Grievant's time card. Grievant's time line is undisputed except for the Company's guesswork and conjecture. Grievant left the Richmond Service Center at about 2:00 p.m.<sup>6</sup> On his way to Vacaville, he pulled off the freeway and spent about 10 minutes inspecting his truck.<sup>7</sup> In normal driving conditions, it takes about an hour to drive between the Richmond and Vacaville Service Centers.<sup>8</sup> Grievant spent 10-15 minutes on his end-of-day routine after arriving at Vacaville. Grievant then drove immediately from Vacaville to his home in Arbuckle which, the Company does not dispute, took about

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>See, CX 2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>See, UX, Attachment A to Post-Hearing Brief.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Tr. 46:6-13.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>Tr. 49:25-50:6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Tr. 49:2-10.

an hour. Adding up the time Grievant spent driving, inspecting his truck, and putting it away in Vacaville, he spent a total of 2.5 hours in transit after he left the job site.

Thus, the total hours he claimed on his time card are accurate.

Grievant believed he was supposed to charge time driving to and from Richmond in his work vehicle to the job. This is how he had always done it. Grievant did not care whether the time was charged as drive time or to the job as it was paid out of the same account at the same rate. Grievant was not counseled by supervisors with authority over lineman – of which Peterson was not one – about having arrived late or left early on February 6. Grievant was asked to work previously authorized overtime the very next weekend which he did.

Finally, Arbitration Case No. 304<sup>10</sup> is on point. The Company's reliance on Review Committee Case No. 20762 is misplaced because that case involved time-card fraud on <u>twelve</u> different assignments. Other PRC cases (Nos. 12635,<sup>11</sup> 2188, and 1836) make clear that a single instance of misuse of Company time "generally results in a Written Reminder . . ."

#### **OPINION**

The Company bears the burden to demonstrate that just cause exists for Grievant's discharge. The just cause standard, generally, requires persuasive proof<sup>12</sup> that the rules and/or policies alleged were violated and, if so, that under the totality of circumstances, the penalty imposed is not excessive; i.e., outside the zone of reasonableness for the proven misconduct. In addition, generally, the just cause standard favors progressive discipline which affords an employee the opportunity to modify behavior before more serious discipline up to and including dismissal is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>JX 3, p. 4 ¶ 14.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>See, UX-A, Attachment to Post-Hearing Brief.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Employees who made false entries for themselves on time cards received Written Reminders.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>The Arbitrator understands the Union sees this as "clear and convincing evidence."

imposed. Progressive discipline, however, need not always follow the counseling, oral warning, written warning, suspension and discharge path in lockstep order. The facts and circumstances in each case determine the appropriate level of discipline. Moreover, progressive discipline concepts do not apply in the face of proven gross misconduct which warrants summary dismissal in the first instance.

Without question, "theft" of Company product, property and/or time is most often a summary discharge event when established. In fact, employees generally do not have to be formally notified that, if they steal from the Company or one of its customers, they will most likely lose their job. As usual, the fundamental issue turns on the question of proof. Theft is a willful – not negligent – act. The record must demonstrate that the employee charged understood what he/she was doing and intended to do it.

It is not difficult to understand why the Company argues its case so vigorously. Given the timing of the call-in complaint, the time card stating "Street lights – various Loc." until 15:30 (3:30 p.m.) and Grievant's somewhat tardy recollection that he left Richmond at 2:00 p.m., the falsification inference was raised. Further, the Company sees a 30-minute unsupported overtime claim, even if Grievant's I-80 stop and the end of work time are credited.

Each such case turns on its own facts and circumstances and, therefore, must be decided on a case-by-case basis. On this record, the Board cannot find a willful intent to steal time. First, Grievant's testimony that his supervisor(s) told him how to make out the time card on an overtime day is unrebutted. More specifically, the Company does not raise an issue with Grievant's 0700-1100 entry which also states "Street lights – various Loc." This entry, for the morning of the same day, clearly supports Grievant's testimony that he included the one-hour Vacaville-Richmond drive in this entry as "on-the-job" time, as distinguished from commute time. Put simply, the Board accepts Grievant's explanation on his method of time keeping.

Second, once Grievant's method of timekeeping on an overtime day is

 accepted,<sup>13</sup> the Company's position cannot stand. Clearly, there is no dispute Grievant's travel time from home to Vacaville is about one hour and Vacaville to Richmond is also about a one-hour drive. The citizen's complaint buttresses Grievant's testimony that he pulled over on I-80 to check his truck for about 10 minutes. And, the Company does not really challenge the fact that Grievant, like many employees driving to and from a fixed starting location (Vacaville) use some, in effect, turn-in time at shift's end; e.g., here, 10-15 minutes. Accordingly, if Grievant left Richmond at 1400 (2:00 p.m.), stopped for 10 minutes on the highway, used 10-15 minutes at the Vacaville Service Center and then drove home, the total time is +/-2 hours and 25 minutes. Put simply, +/- 5 – not 30 – minutes are at issue.

The record does not persuasively establish that Grievant intended to steal the 5 minutes. The necessary inference is that he negligently rounded up the time to make the day end at an even point – 1630. Absent evidence that employees are authorized to round up time on an overtime assignment, Grievant knew, or should have known, that the Code of Conduct requires employees to file accurate records including, *inter alia*, time cards. The following Award will put Grievant on notice that time cards on an overtime assignment must be accurately completed.

The grievance is sustained in part and denied in part.

#### **AWARD**

1. Grievant was not discharged for just cause. Grievant shall be reinstated to his former position as soon as practical and his improper discharge shall be converted to a Written Reminder. Grievant shall be made whole<sup>14</sup> for all losses in wages and benefits, including seniority, from the first day he was removed from service to and including the last workday prior to his return to service.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>If the Vacaville Service Center believes there should be another way of recording an overtime day assignment, it can take the necessary steps to change the status quo.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Outside earnings and usual and customary deductions (taxes, etc.) will be deducted from the gross-make whole amount to establish a net make whole amount which shall be paid to Grievant as soon as practical.

1	2. The Boar	d retains jurisdiction over the matter for and limited purpose of resolving disputes,
2	if any, ove	er remedy.
3	DATED: February 12, 2013	
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5	*	ALEXANDER COHN - Neutral Board Member
6		Brenda Legge
7	(oencure/dissents)	BRENDA LEGGE - Company Board Member
8		Down Viader
9	(concurs/dissents)	DOUGOVEADER - Company Board Member
10		Healer.
11	(concurs/dissents)	F. E. ED DWYER - Union Board Member
12		Clase I turne
13	(concurs/dissents)	JOE OSTERLUND - Union Board Member
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