#46 Arb. #46 1 ADOLPH M. KOVEN 304 Greenwich Street 2 San Francisco, California 94133 **Telephone:** (415)392-6548 8 4 8 6 IN ARBITRATION PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT TO TITLE 10212 OF THE 7 CURRENT COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES 8 9 10 In the Matter of a Controversy 11 between 18 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 18 UNION 1245, OPINION AND AWARD 14 and OF THE 15 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY. BOARD OF ARBITRATION 16 Involving the suspensions of 17 grievants S and B and and the discharge of grievant M 18 19 80 81 This Arbitration arises pursuant to Agreement between the 88 INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRICAL WORKERS, AFL-CIO, LOCAL 28 UNION 1245, hereinafter referred to as the "Union", and PACIFIC 84 GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, hereinafter referred to as the "Company", 85 under which ADOLPH M. KOVEN was selected to serve as Chairman of a 86 Board of Arbitration which was also composed of LAWRENCE N. FOSS, 87 Union Board Member; ALBERT E. SANDOVAL, Union Board Member; DAVID 88 BERGMAN, Company Board Member; and ARTHUR M. KEZER, Company Board 29 Member; and under which the Award of the Board of Arbitration 80 would be final and binding upon the parties. 81 Hearing was held on November 19, 1973 in San Francisco, 88 California. Both parties were afforded full opportunity for the

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1 examination and cross-examination of witnesses, the introduction of 2 relevant exhibits, and for argument. Both parties filed post-hearing 3 briefs. **APPEARANCES:** 5 On behalf of the Union: 6 Ronald E. Yank, Esq. Brundage, Neyhart, Gm din & Beeson 100 Bush Street, Suite 2600 7 San Francisco, California 94104 8 On behalf of the Company: 9 L. V. Brown, Esq. 10 Pacific Gas and Electric Company 245 Market Street 11 San Francisco, California 94105 12 ISSUE 13 Did the suspensions without pay of grievants S 🧀 and 14 violate the provisions ₿ċ of the applicable Labor Agreements? If so, what 18 should be the remedy? 16 Did the discharge of grievant 17 M violate the applic-able Labor Agreement? If so, 18 what should be the remedy? 19 **RELEVANT SECTION OF THE CONTRACT** 20 Sec. 7.1 21 The management of the Company and its business and the direction of its working forces 22 are vested exclusively in the Company, and this includes. . . the following. . . to 28 suspend. . . or discharge for just cause. 24 INTRODUCTION: 85 Three separate grievances are involved in this case and each 86 of them deals with a fact of criminal arrest for conduct away from 87 the Company premises and not on Company time.' Two of the griev-28 ants were suspended without pay and the third was discharged. 89 In reference to prior cases on this subject, four prior 80 situations were put in evidence: 81 (1) A meter reader was arrested for robbery and assault 88 with a deadly weapon, and the Company discussed the arrest with

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1 him and investigated his prior record. After determining that the 2 charges would probably be dropped, he was not suspended; (2) A meter reader was arrested for possession and sale of heroin. He 3 was suspended while the Company conducted a thorough investigation, 4 and after it decided that he was an average employee, he was rein-5 6 stated pending determination of the criminal charges. He was re-7 moved from meter reading to a job where he could be supervised; (3) An employee who was arrested for possession and cultivation of 8 9 marijuana was not suspended because he did not have public contact. 10 Moreover, after discussing the charges with him shortly after his 11 arrest, the Company was convinced that he was innocent of the 12 charges. Although he ultimately pleaded guilty to a reduced 13 charge, he continued to work on a Company work furlough program; 14 and (4) An employee who was convicted of a crime involving violence 15 was not suspended but continued to work while serving weekends in jail. The Company testified that he was a long-term employee with 16 17 a good work record, and that he was working under supervision. 18

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19 Facts:

20 was suspended on July 8, 1970 after being arrested S 81 on July 6 for possession of a deadly weapon, and several charges 22 based on cultivating and processing marijuana. S worked a 28 little more than a year as a mechanic. He lubricated and did 24 minor repairs on Company vehicles on the noon to 9:00 P.M. shift at 25 the Concord facility. He was not reinstated until May 27, 1971 26 after the court proceedings were terminated.

S

An article in the local newspaper, though it did not mention
the Company, brought his arrest to the attention of his supervisor.
Although the grievant was a good worker, the reason given for his
suspension was that he worked without supervision at night with
only one other employee who was in a lower classification, and
that the Company was concerned with the safe repair of its auto-

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mobiles and his influence upon the other employees.

2 On April 27, 1971 he pleaded guilty to one count of poses3 sion of marijuana, a misdemeanor, and was put on probation. During
4 the period of his long suspension, he made several contacts with
5 the Company requesting reinstatement.

6 Position of Parties re: S

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(a) <u>Company</u>:

8 Although S was a good employee, suspension was called 9 for. The decision to suspend S : was thoughtfully weighed a-10 gainst the circumstances under which S worked in connection 11 with the Company's obligation to provide for the safety and welfare 12 of other employees as well as the public. Moreover, even if

13 S: is entitled to back pay, such pay should be awarded only
14 for the period of suspension during which he was not responsible
15 for the delay in court proceedings. S or his attorney was
16 responsible for some of the delay, and no Award should be made for
17 that period of time. <u>Case No. 804</u> is consistent with this result.
18 (b) Union.

(b) <u>Union</u>:

19 The Company admits that S. was a good worker, had no 80 public contact, and no unfavorable publicity from his arrest re-81 sulted since the Company's name was not mentioned in the newspaper 82 article. Nonetheless he was suspended. The reasons given by the 28 Company are insufficient. No independent Company investigation 24 was made of the facts behind his arrest, and the Company merely 85 monitored the court proceedings. The Company could have easily 26 placed S back on his prior Oakland garage job if it was con-27 cerned about the matter of close supervision.

Review Committee Case No. 804 is not helpful to the Company
because the opinion itself states that the dispute was settled
"without prejudice to the position of either Union or Company",
and thus was not "intended to have. . . precedential value."
Furthermore, neither S nor his attorney deliberately caused

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the delay. Although several continuances were granted, these con-1 tinuances are a normal part of criminal procedure, and it would be 2 manifestly unfair to require S: 3 to bear the cost of those delays. Finally, S was sentenced on April 27, 1971, and not reinstated until a month later with no explanation given for the 8 delay in his reinstatement. The Company discriminated against 8 because he was not given the same treatment as other em-7 S. ployees were given as discussed in the foregoing. 8

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10 Facts:

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11 According to the review committee on January 15, 1973, was arrested for possession and sale of marijuana and pos-12 B. 18 session of cocaine. A newspaper article identified him as a "meter reader". He was suspended on January 17, 1973, after the Company 14 reviewed his prior work history. On February 2, 1973, the grievant 15 16 pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor charges (possession of marijuana and being in a room where marijuana was used), and put on proba-17 18 tion. He was reinstated on February 6, 1973.

In reviewing his history, the Company found that from the
time of his employment in 1964 his record showed previous charges
of unsatisfactory performance, excessive absenteeism, and negative
attitudes.

28 Positions of the Partiesre: B

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(a) <u>Company</u>:

B was identified in a newspaper article as a "meter
reader" and this reference clearly identified the Company. As this
Arbitrator himself recognized in a prior decision (48 LA 264, 266),
the Company must exercise great caution in retaining employees who
are charged with a crime if such employees, like B , have contact with the public.

81 B. worked unsupervised, away from the Company's
82 premises. Even though he was not intended to enter customer homes

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1 as frequently as service personnel, nevertheless the public would 2 acquire an unfavorable attitude regarding the character of Company 3 employees if he had not been suspended pending determination of the 4 criminal charges. Furthermore, it was alleged that B was in 5 possession of a hard narcotic. This factor combined with his un-6 satisfactory work record justified the conclusion that he was un-7 trustworthy. Indeed, the Company was lenient because B ''s 8 supervisor recommended immediate discharge rather than suspension.

(b) Union:

Not only did no customer complain when B ____ was arrested,
but the newspaper article itself did not connect B with the
Company. Although his job involved a contact with the public, the
Company was not worried that B might sell narcotics on his
route. It was only concerned with his trustworthiness.

15 The Company should have treated B like the prior meter
16 readers who had been arrested. He was not contacted by the Com17 pany nor did it consider assigning him to a supervised job. Since
18 the Company did not establish just cause for disciplining B ,
19 he is entitled to back pay for the period of his suspension.

COMPANY POLICY

21 Positions of Parties re: Company Policy: 82 (a) Company Policy:

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(a) Company:

23 Under its policy the Company conducts an investigation dur-24 ing the time that the employee is suspended and while judicial 25 proceedings are pending. The Company's written policy states that 26 "employees who are arrested and held for crimes of violence or 27 which involve moral turpitude should be suspended at least until a 88 thorough investigation has been made by the Company, and, in some 29 cases, until the decision has been made by the court." If a man 80 had been an unsatisfactory employee or committed misconduct on the 81 job, the Company would not directly contact him after his arrest 88 to investigate the charges.

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1 The Company has a flexible policy in respect to suspending 2 an employee who is arrested, and takes into consideration such factors as the nature of the charge; the employee's length of 3 service and the quality of his prior performance; whether the em-4 ployee had contact with the public; availability of reassignment 5 6 to a different work area; and the degree of supervision under which 7 the employee worked. Crimes of violence or those crimes of a "ser-8 ious moral nature" generally call for suspension. Thus, even though the arrests may be for the same crime, one employee might 9 10 be suspended while the other employee would not be suspended. 11 According to Company policy, individuals who have previously been 12 convicted of a crime are employable depending on the person's par-13 ticular background and the likelihood that he was been rehabili-14 tated.

Two principles emerge from prior arbitrations involving the 15 suspension of employees. $\frac{1}{}$ First, the Company is entitled to sus-16 17 pend an employee pending determination of criminal charges; and 18 second, upon finding of "just cause" to support the suspension, 19 the loss of pay during the suspension period is a proper penalty. 20

(b) Union:

81 The Company informed the Union that it was the Company's 88 policy not to suspend an employee unless the crime for which he 23 was arrested involved violence or moral turpitude.

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 $\frac{1}{In}$ Arbitration No. 38 involving an employee who was suspended 25 after having been charged with a crime, the arbitrator recognized that the usual procedure agreed on by the parties is to suspend an employee pending the outcome of the case and not to challenge the suspension until ultimate disposition of the 26 27 criminal charges. In that case, because criminal charges were 28 dropped, the employee was given back pay for the period of his suspension. In <u>Arbitration No. 24</u>, suspension was also recognized as proper and the arbitrator held that "Since the grievant's 29 misconduct gave rise to the necessity of an investigation, the Company should not be required to compensate him during that period." Other cases have held that suspension is justified pending the determination of criminal charges. (National Steel 80 81 Corp., 60 LA 613, 618; Brown and Williamson Tobacco Co., 60 LA 502) 88

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1 Although the Company claims that in imposing a suspension it it takes into account various factors, such as an employee's work 2 record and the nature of his job, its treatment of these grievants 3 was contrary to its own stated policy in that it did not investi-4 5 gate the charges against B. and S any further than to 6 monitor the court proceedings. In three prior cases, the Company 7 spoke with the arrested employees, and they were not suspended 8 while the criminal charges were being decided even though in two 9 of these prior cases the employees had contact with the public $\frac{2}{}$ One of these employees was put into a job where he was supervised. 10 In another case, the convicted employee served jail time without 11 12 being suspended, continuing with the Company on a work-furlough 13 program.

What employees do or do not do outside working hours and off Company premises is not a proper concern of the Company so long as no adverse effect has taken place in the employment relationship or to the Company's reputation.

Although <u>Arbitration No. 38</u> involved a situation where all
charges were dropped against the arrest ed employee, and in this
dispute the grievants each pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor, the
distinction is not controlling and the Company is obligated to pay
B_i and S during the period when they were suspended because the Company did not establish just cause for its discipline.

That the Company should run this risk is appropriate since
it will prevent helter-skelter suspension based on arrests that
have no harmful impact on the Company. Since the arrests should
not have caused any suspension in the first instance, full back
pay should be awarded to S i and B.

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 $\frac{2}{Two}$ of the employees who were meter readers like Baxter pleaded guilty to reduced charges.

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2 Facts:

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3 M was discharged as a result of his conviction for 4 an offense committed off the job. He was an Equipment Operator 8 with over ten years service at the time of his arrest on February 6 4, 1973. He was charged with one count of grand theft and two 7 counts of auto burglary. A newspaper report of his arrest came to 8 the attention of a supervisor. Because he was in court on 9 February 5, he did not work and was asked by his supervisor why he 10 had not worked. The grievant stated that he was sick. When the 11 supervisor called his attention to the newspaper article, the 12 grievant said, "Oh, well, that would make anyone sick." On May 10, 13 after pleading guilty to a lesser charge of auto burglary, a mis-14 demeanor, he was placed on probation.

15 The Company's investigation consisted of contacting local 16 police and following up the coutt proceedings. Because it found 17 "no mitigating circumstances surrounding the burglary", he was 18 discharged on June 12, 1973. Prior to his discharge, there were 19 no complaints to higher management about his performance. After 20 the discharge, however, a foreman testified before the Union-Com-81 pany committee investigating the grievance, that the grievant could 22 not be relied upon to keep busy and had to be watched. Moreover, 88 at the arbitration hearing an additional complaint was made by two 24 crew foremen to the effect that they had requested that the griev-28 ant be removed from their crews because he was uncooperative and 26 was creating a "bad situation". In addition, for the first time 27 at the arbitration hearing, a foreman testified that some weeks 88 before the discharge the grievant stole lumber from a job site. 89 When ordered to return the lumber, the grievant said that if he 80 wanted the lumber, he would "throw it in the weeds and come back 81 and get it at night." The grievant also stated some two or three 32 months after his arrest that the "only thing wrong with (the crime)

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. . was the fact that (he) got caught."

Because of personal and financial problems, the grievant
was under considerable strain in the period both before and after
his arrest and prior to his discharge.

5 Position of Parties re: M :

Company:

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7 Despite the Company's employment policy of hiring persons 8 convicted of crime, the Company need not retain an employee such 9 who committed a serious offense directly related to as Mi 10 Company business. Although M is not a public contact em-11 ployee, he works on the property of Company customers. The fact 12 that he stole lumber from a customer's property establishes him as 18 a dishonest employee and not entitled to be retained in the Com-14 pany's service.

15 Even before the arrest, M 3 was an unsatisfactory em-16 ployee. His last two supervisors did not want him on their crews. 17 lied about his absence at work the day that he was M 18 graigned. Moreover, M ; did not hold honesty in serious re-19 gard since he himself stated that he would continue to steal after 80 he was caught stealing lumber on the job, and even after his crim-81 inal conviction, he essentially said that there was nothing wrong 88 with stealing, but only with getting caught. It is incontrovert-23 ible that M is not a good prospect for rehabilitation.

24 That the lumber stealing incident did not come to light un-28 til after his discharge is irrelevant since his supervisor, with-86 out disclosing that he know about the incident, took the lumber 87 stealing into account when he recommended discharge. As a result, 88 that incident played a part in the reason for his discharge. That 89 the incident was not reported until the arbitration hearing is 80 understandable since the foreman himself was a member of the bar-81 gaining unit and hesitant to cause M to lose his job. An 88 arbitration is a trial de novo and the facts which were estab-

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lished at the arbitration hearing are the determinative facts.
 (b) Union:

With one exception, all the evidence before the joint in-3 4 vestigating committee established M as a satisfactory emő ployee. That one exception involved a supervisor who told the committee that the grievant could not be relied upon, and therefore 6 had to be watched. Not until the arbitration hearing was the 7 A really damaging evidence against M produced: (a) One 9 supervisor stated that the grievant and another employee created 10 "a bad situation" on the crew, but it was admitted that the other employee had a "very bad influence" on the grievant; (b) A second 11 18 supervisor's statement that the grieyant was uncooperative should 18 be disregarded because he did not make the statement before the investigating committee; (c) The incident regarding the stealing of 14 15 lumber was not reported until the arbitration hearing. Moreover, 16 the grievant was not previously reprimanded for poor work or for 17 anything else. The matters which came to light after the dis-18 charge did not play a part in his discharge and should be disre-19 garded.

20 That conclusion follows the established rule in other arbitrations. $\frac{3}{}$ The same reasoning in respect to post-discharge 81 88 conduct applies to M ' statement made after the discharge, 88 i.e., that "the biggest mistake that he made was getting caught." 24 Moreover, M made this statement at a time when he was under 25 considerable stress because his ex-wife had committed suicide and 86 he had just taken custody of his two young sons. At the hearing, 87 M stated that he regretted his actions, and that he did not 88 intend again to engage in improper conduct. In summary, M 11 29 80

3/<u>Arbitration No. 43</u> is consistent with the general rule that post-discharge conduct is outside the scope of whether just cause for discharge exists (See <u>Rotor Tool Co.</u>, 49 LA 210, 213; <u>Riverside Book Bindery, Inc.</u>, Elkouri and Elkouri, <u>How Arbitration Works</u>, 3rd ed. (INA, 1973), 634-5.).

- DOLPH M. KOVEN LAW BORPORATION INTRODUC-JULION BASTLE 564 COLUMNON STREET ENGLOSE 2-6540 1 conduct occurred outside working hours; he was considered a good
2 worker; and the Company suffered no adverse publicity. For these
5 reasons M: should be reinstated with back pay.
4 CONCLUSION:

8 It is well established in arbitration that conduct away from 6 the plant outside of working hours justifies discipline whenever 7 the grievant's behavior has harmed the Company's reputation or 8 product or where such conduct renders the employee unable to 9 perform his duties or leads to a reluctance on the part of other 10 employees to work with the grievant. It is also established that 11 such factors as the nature of the grievant's job and the crime with 12 which he is charged becomes relevant.

18 <u>S</u>

16 Of the three grievants, S ' case is clearly the 15 strongest. All that the Company essentially argues in his situa-16 tion is that his suspension was; justified because he worked with-17 out supervision, because it was apprehensive about the safety of 18 the cars that he repaired, and because of his possible influence 19 on the other employee with whom he worked.

80 That Company case is not sufficient to overcome the case in 81 S s' favor. S , was admittedly a good employee, he had no 88 public contact, and the Company's reputation was in no way affected 85 by his arrest. Moreover, the Company did not treat S in the 84 same way as it previously treated other employees arrested for 88 similar offenses. It did not discuss the arrest with him or give 86 him the opportunity to convince the Company that some alternative 87 other than suspension was warranted. Furthermore, the Company did 88 not consider reassignment alternatives in which he would be placed 89 under close supervision, a method it had previously applied to 80 another employee in preference to suspension. Finally, only the 81 most cursory investigation was conducted prior to his suspension, 88 contrary to its prior practice of making a more searching

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1 investigation.

For these reasons, the suspension was improper and S
is entitled to back pay. The only question which remains is for
what period is back pay due. The Company urges a reduced amount
because it claims that the grievant and/or his attorney were responsible for some of the delay in the court proceedings.

7 The Company's view in this respect is not persuasive. First 8 the Company should have treated the grievant in the same fashion 9 that it treated the prior offenders, and if it had given S 10 the consideration to which he was entitled by virtue of his prior 11 good performance, no suspension should have resulted. By failing 18 to do so, the grievant became entitled to be paid as though no sus-18 pension had occurred; and second, on the basis of the record, both 14 in regard to Company evidence and to Review Committee Case No. 804 15 (which involved a settlement between the parties in reference to a 16 particular set of facts and was "without prejudice" to the posi-17 tion of the parties), we cannot reach the conclusion that the 18 grievant is to be held responsible for the delay in the criminal 19 proceedings. There is no evidence that he unconsciously and im-20 properly delayed the proceedings, and to the contrary, the con-81 tinuances which he sought and which were granted were in further-88 ance of his defense, a right to which he was entitled and which the 23 court recognized. In order to reach the conclusion that the Com-24 pany favors, more culpable conduct in this connection would be re-88 quired.

86 <u>B</u>

87 R 's situation is not as clear-cut as S ۱. He did 88 not present as solid a work history as S , in that he had 89 numerous previous warnings in respect to performance on the job, 50 absenteeism, and "negative attitude". The charges against him at 81 the outset were more serious in that not only marijuana but cocaine was involved, even though he was later found guilty only **32**

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1 of a lesser charge. Unlike S he was in direct contact with
2 the public, and unlike S: (who was a good employee), in
3 B 's case the Company took into consideration his poor employ4 ment record when it decided to suspend him.

5 But in some important respects, the basic factors which are 6 favorable to S also apply to Be . No direct reference 7 was made in the newspapers connecting B with the Company, nor 8 did his arrest have any unfavorable ffect upon the Company's pro-9 duct or upon other employees. Moreover, the Company did not inter-10 prior to his suspension to get his side of the story, view B 11 nor did it consider placing him in a supervised job and in a job 18 situation where he could have no public contact. In short, like 13 , he did not get the same treatment that had been afforded 14 other employees in the past.

15 The Company says that despite these considerations it was 16 justified in suspending B. when it took his past record into 17 account. While the Company is not precluded from considering an 18 employee's past record, that record must have some direct and 19 relevant relationship to the arrest in order to justify suspension. 80 For example, the mere fact that an employee may have a poor ab-81 sent es record does not justify his suspension if he is arrested for 88 bookmaking. If he had previously been disciplined on the job for 23 gambling and later for bookmaking, the Company would be justified 84 in taking into account his record on the job in applying for the 25 arrest off the job.

Thus, for all the reasons set forth in the foregoing,
b 's suspension was unjustified and he is entitled to back pay
for the period of suspension.

89 <u>M</u>

Two possible approaches are available in the M situation. One way is to consider the Company's reasons for M
discharge at the time that it discharged him up to and including

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the Review Committee hearing. The other way is to consider the
 Company's justification for his discharge as of the time of the
 arbitration hearing.

The case against M ; for discharge at the time of his 5 discharge was based almost entirely upon his conviction for auto burglary. Except for one supervisor's mild criticism of the 6 grievant and the grievant's cavalier attitude towards his con-7 8 viction, the grievant's past record was not put in issue, and did not contribute to the reasons for his discharge. In other words, 9 at this point, the Company considered the criminal conviction 10 11 essentially sufficient in itself to justify his termination.

But that Company approach does not meet the criteria for 12 discharge for misconduct away from the plant. No showing was made 13 that his crime had any relationship to the Company's reputation or 14 product, or that it would prevent him from carrying out his duties 18 16 on the job, or that it made him unacceptable to fellow employees. 17 Nor is the penalty of discharge, given these particular facts, in harmony with the customary arbitral approach to this subject.4'18 19 Moreover, M had worked for the Company for over ten years, 20 and so far as the Company knew at the time of discharge, he was a 81 satisfactory employee.

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4/Discharge or suspension not sustained in Akers Motor Line, Inc. 24 41 LA 987 (driving under influence of alcohol); <u>Babcock and</u> <u>Wilcox Co.</u>, 43 LA 242 (contributing to the delinquency of a minor); <u>Menzie Dairy Co.</u>, 45 LA 283 (charges of pandering and obscene <u>exhibition); Sherwin Williams Co.</u>, 22 LA 1 (rape); <u>Republic Steel</u> <u>Corp.</u>, 23 LA 808 (burglary); <u>International Harvestor Co.</u>, 24 LA <u>729</u> (criminal sexual psychopath); <u>Sertain-Teed Products Corp.</u>, 24 LA 606 (aggravated assault); <u>Niagara Frontier Transit System</u>, Inc.. <u>26 LA 575</u> (aexual offenses). <u>Sherwin Williams Co.</u>, 22 LA 1 sets 25 26 27 26 LA 575 (sexual offenses), <u>Sherwin Williams Co.</u>, 22 LA 1 sets forth the customary grounds: (1) a claim must exist that other employees have refused to work with the grievant because of alleged 88 29 offense; (2) the Company's name was mentioned either in newspaper article or court records of a case; and (3) it is a fundamental principle of law that a person is presumed innocent until proved guilty. Should employee be found guilty and sentenced to prison, 80 81 employer would then have the right to discharge him, not for his 38 guilt, but for his absence from work.

The picture changes radically when we approach the M

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situation as of the time of the arbitration hearing. 1 Several im-2 portant factors in his disfavor are added, namely, two supervisors who were uncomplimentary about the grievant's job performance, and 8 in fact, by virtue of his attitude and behavior he was regarded as a highly undesirable crew member. Most important, however, is what 5 6 amounts to a stipulated fact that the grievant stole lumber from a 7 Company customer on Company time, and indeed this act took place after his arrest and before his conviction. In addition, his 8 declarations and attitude toward this misconduct or continued mis-9 10 conduct of this sort was uncompromising. In view of the undisputed 11 showing of misconduct which directly relates to the Company's 12 business, there is no doubt that if all the evidence introduced at 13 the arbitration hearing was to be taken into consideration, his 14 discharge would be amply justified.

18 The Union is correct in its position that misconduct which 16 comes to light after a discharge has taken place cannot be used to 17 justify the discharge, and that the Company's reason at the time of 18 discharge did not constitute just cause. However, M case 19 is not the usual situation where the Company attempts to justify 80 the discharge for misconduct which occurred after the discharge 81 has taken place. In ' case, it is not that his misconduct 88 took place after discharge but rather that the Company only became 28 aware of misconduct serious enough to justify discharge after it 84 discharged him, but which misconduct occurred before his discharge. 85 Thus, while the discharge is not justified as of the time that it 86 was imposed, the later-discovered evidence establishes M 87 as an unacceptable employee.

Thus, though the discharge of the grievant is not sustained,
by way of remedy the conclusion follows that the grievant is not
entitled to reinstatement because the record clearly establishes
that had the Company been aware of his total record, discharge
would have been amply justified. Thus, the grievant is entitled to

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back pay from the date of discharge to the time the Company first 1 learned of the lumber-stealing incident. Jurisdiction is retained 2 by the Arbitrator in the event that the parties cannot agree on the 3 exact amount of back pay. 4 AWARD 5 6 (1) S :: His suspension was improper and he is entitled to back pay for that period less whatever he re-7 ceived from outside earnings and/or unemployment compensation during that 8 period. 0 : His suspension was im-(2) B proper and he is entitled to back pay 10 for that period less whatever he received from outside earnings and/or 11 unemployment compensation during that period. 12 3: The discharge of the 13 (3) M grievant is not sustained. However, by way of remedy, the grievant is not en-14 titled to reinstatement but is entitled to back pay from the date of discharge 15 to the time that the Company first learned of the lumber-stealing incident. 16 Jurisdiction is retained by the Arbitrator in the event that the parties 17 cannot agree on the exact amount of back pay. 18 19 20 5-24-74 Dated: 81 ADOLPH M. KOVEN, Chairman, Board of Arbitration 22 28 24 Concur re: Simonds: 25 Dated: 4/30/74 /s/ Lawrence N. Foss 86 LAWRENCE N. FOSS, Union Board Member 27 Dated: 5-3-74 /s/ Albert E. Sandoval 88 ALBERT E. SANDOVAL, Union Board 29 Member 80 Dated: DAVID BERGHAN, Company Board Member 81 88 -17-OLPH M. KOVEN

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1 Dated: 2 ARTHUR M. KEZER, Company Board Member 8 Dissent re: Simonds: 4 5 Dated: 6 LAWRENCE N. FOSS, Union Board Member 7 Dated: 8 ALBERT E. SANDOVAL, Union Board 9 Member 10 /s/ David Bergman DAVID BERGMAN, Company Board Member Dated: 5/6/74 11 12 Dated: 5/7/74 /s/ Arthur M. Kezer 15 ARTHUR M. KEZER, Company Board Member 14 Concur re: Baxter: 15 18 Dated: 4/30/74 /s/ Lawrence N. Foss LAWRENCE N. FOSS, Union Board Member 17 18 Dated: 5/2/74 /s/ Albert E. Sandoval 19 ALBERT E. SANDOVAL, Union Board member 20 81 Dated: DAVID BERGMAN, Company Board Member 88 23 Dated: ARTHUR M. KEZER, Company Board Member 24 25 26 Dissent re: Baxter: 87 Dated: LAWRENCE N. FOSS, Union Board Member 88 89 Dated: ALBERT E. SANDOVAL, Union Board 30 member 81 -18-88 BOLPH M. KOVEN LAW BURPERATION THEUSE-JULIES' GAUTLE

1 /s/ David Bergman 2 Dated: 5/6/74 DAVID BERGMAN, Company Board Member 3 /s/ Arthur M. Kezer ARTHUR M. KEZER, Company Board Member 4 Dated: 5/7/74 δ COMPANY CONCURS IN PART-concurs as to the award not co reinstate. Concur re: Medeiros: UNION CONCURS IN PART-Concurs with award of back 6 pay for time period in-7 volved. Dated: <u>/s/ Lawrence N. Foss</u> 4/30/74 LAWRENCE N. FOSS, Union Board Member 8 0 /s/ Albert E. Sandoval Dated: 5/3/74 10 ALBERT E. SANDOVAL, Union Board Member 11 /s/ David Bergman 12 **Dated:** 5/6/74 DAVID BERGMAN, Company Board Member 13 /s/ Arthur M. Kezer 14 Dated: 5/7/74 ARTHUR M. KEZER, Company Board Member 18 COMPANY DISSENTS IN PART- Dissents as to the award of back pay. Dissent re: Medeiros: UNION DISSENTS IN PART-Dissents as to failure 16 to reinstate with full 17 /s/ LAWRENCE N. FOSS LAWRENCE N. FOSS, Union Board Member back pay. 4/30/74 18 19 /s/ ALBERT E. SANDOVAL ALBERT E. SANDOVAL, Union Board Member Dated: 5/3/74 80 81 /s/ DAVID BERGMAN 5/6/74 Dated: 82 DAVID BERGMAN, Company Board Member 28 /s/ ARTHUR M. KEZER ARTHUR M. KEZER, Company Board Member Dated: _ 5/7/74 84 25 26 87 88 29 30 81 88 OLPH M. KOVEN -19-BE-JULIUS' BASTL WHEN STREET